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ARTICLES

#### Injunctions and damages under s 1324 of the Corporations Act: Will McCracken v Phoenix Constructions revive the narrow approach? – Victoria Schnure Baumfield

#### Kumarina and bidders voting in transfer schemes – JS Humphrey

Transfer schemes are an alternative means of acquiring control of a company to making a takeover bid under the provisions in Ch 6 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The recent decision Re Kumarina Resources Ltd [2013] FCA 549 overturned long-standing practice in relation to a certain type of transfer scheme. If followed, the decision would allow a "bidder" to vote at scheme meetings where the scheme consideration for the acquisition of the target shares are shares in another company, and the scheme results in a merger. But the bidder is not allowed to vote where the scheme consideration is cash. The article points out the difficulties arising from this decision and argues that it should not be followed. In providing a "no objection" statement, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) has created uncertainty as to the approach it will take towards the bidders being allowed to vote at scheme meetings where the scheme consideration for the acquisition of target shares are shares in another company. The article also points out that in providing the no objection statement in Kumarina, ASIC appears to have ignored breaches of s 606(1) of the *Corporations Act*. There is a pressing need for ASIC to clarify its position and, in particular, whether or not it will provide a no objection statement in respect of future transfer schemes where a bidder (or its parent company) votes at the scheme meeting. 473

## "Unashamedly more interventionist" courts and the fading significance of a director's state of mind – *Kane Loxley*

Arguably the defining development in modern corporate governance is the increased responsibility that the law ascribes to boards of directors. That development has been achieved in large part through approaching directors' conduct through the objective lens of the "reasonable director" and eschewing the subjective judgment of the particular director whose conduct is impugned. While the shift toward a strict approach is in line with the community expectation that those responsible for corporate decision-making be held to account for their actions, it seems that the rather rapid shift in attitude in recent times has reached a point where courts are paying lip service to the relevance of a director's state of mind and commercial judgment, and instead finding a way to have recourse to the nominal "reasonable director" as the touchstone against which all conduct is assessed. This article analyses how the relationship between the subjective and objective is applied to each of the duties of a director in ss 180 to 184 of the *Corporations Act 2001* (Cth).

### OVERSEAS NOTES: HONG KONG, SINGAPORE AND MALAYSIA - Say Goo

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