*Please note that the links to the content in this Part will direct you to Westlaw AU.<\/p>\n
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The latest issue of the\u00c2\u00a0Australian Law Journal<\/em> (Volume 94 Part 5) contains the following material:<\/p>\n CURRENT ISSUES<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Justice Fran\u00c3\u00a7ois Kunc<\/strong><\/p>\n CONVEYANCING AND PROPERTY<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editors: Robert Angyal SC and Brendan Edgeworth<\/strong><\/p>\n ENVIRONMENTAL LAW<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Justice Rachel Pepper<\/strong><\/p>\n INTERNATIONAL FOCUS<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Professor Stuart Kaye<\/strong><\/p>\n Dixonian Legalism and its Adherents: Assessing the Place for Policy Choices under \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Strict and Complete Legalism\u00e2\u20ac\u009d in Theory and Practice<\/strong><\/em><\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Ned Hirst<\/p>\n This article provides an account of the literalist paradigm that prevailed before Owen Dixon was appointed to the High Court and compares Dixon\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s legalism to the pre-existing norm. It uses a case study of Dixon\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s judgment in Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth to illustrate the way in which his legalism operated in comparison to the literalism expounded by the Court in Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd. I argue Dixon\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s legalism allowed for a more open acknowledgment of judicial choice than the literalist orthodoxy, and that the Mason Court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s clearer articulation of policy choices owed much to Dixon\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s interpretative techniques. On this view, the perceived legitimacy of interpretative choices would appear to relate more to the political character of the decisions reached rather than the soundness of the judicial approach.<\/p>\n Discrimination Against Employees of Religious Schools in Australia, US and the EU \u00e2\u20ac\u201c A Comparison in Light of Human Rights and Deliberative Democracy<\/strong><\/em><\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Robert M\u00c4\u2122\u00c5\u00bcyk<\/p>\n Should religious schools be allowed to discriminate against employees? While different legal systems offer varying answers to this question, the Australian federal regulation allows discrimination based on chosen attributes specified by the legislator. This solution has also been endorsed by the 2018 Religious Freedom Review. In the comparative context of the United States and the European Union, this article discusses three major options for regulating employment by religious schools: the solution in which the legislator foresees permissible grounds of discrimination (Australia), the model of broad exception for religious schools from discrimination laws (US) and the inherent requirements model (EU). I argue that both the theory of deliberative democracy and the requirements of human rights speak against the model of legislative specification of permissible discrimination grounds. Consecutively, I contend that international human rights support the preferability of the European inherent requirements model over the American model of general exception.<\/p>\n Resolving Conflicts at the Interface of Public and Private Law<\/strong><\/em><\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Ellen Rock<\/p>\n Public and private law converge in cases where causes of action and remedies from both sides of the divide might be brought to bear, such as where the same conduct might amount to both a tort and crime, or where demonstrating invalidity of an administrative decision is an element of tortious liability. This article canvasses a range of procedural tools that can be utilised to shape the relationship between public and private law; moving between independent, staged, prioritised and collaborative relationships. The question of whether these tools ought to be utilised in a given case is influenced by a range of policy concerns tied to the interests of the parties, the institution of the courts, and the wider public. Accordingly, the relationship between public and private law, and the question of what principles and remedies ought to apply at the interface, requires a delicate balancing act between these interests.<\/p>\n OBITUARY<\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n For the PDF\u00c2\u00a0version of the table of contents, click here: ALJ Vol 94 No 5 Contents<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n
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