*Please note that the links to the content in this Part will direct you to Westlaw AU.<\/p>\n
To purchase an article, please email:\u00c2\u00a0LTA.Service@thomsonreuters.com<\/a>\u00c2\u00a0or\u00c2\u00a0contact us on 1300 304 195\u00c2\u00a0(Australian customers) or +61 2 8587 7980\u00c2\u00a0(international customers) during business hours\u00c2\u00a0(Mon-Fri, 8am-6pm AEST).<\/p>\n The latest issue of the Public Law Review<\/em> (Volume 31 Part 1) contains the following material:<\/p>\n EDITORIAL<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c General Editors: Cheryl Saunders AO and Janet McLean<\/em><\/p>\n KEYNOTE LECTURE<\/a><\/p>\n COMMENTS<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Dan Meagher<\/em><\/p>\n Spence v Queensland and the Federal Balance: How Many Swallows Make a Summer?<\/strong><\/em><\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Nicholas Aroney<\/p>\n This article examines the reasoning in Spence v Queensland <\/em>(Spence<\/em>), in which a majority of the High Court held that s 302CA of the Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918 <\/em>(Cth) was beyond the Commonwealth\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s legislative power to make laws with respect to federal elections. It is argued that while the reasoning invokes orthodox approaches to the interpretation of the Constitution <\/em>established since Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd <\/em>(Engineers\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 Case<\/em>), it also affirms propositions that have previously been regarded as heretical invocations of reserved powers reasoning. In particular, the majority affirmed that there is a \u00e2\u20ac\u0153heartland of State legislative power\u00e2\u20ac\u009d and that it is relevant, when considering whether a federal law is incidental to the subject matter of Commonwealth power, that the effect of the law is to \u00e2\u20ac\u0153invade State power\u00e2\u20ac\u009d. In previous decisions, members of the Court have criticised such propositions as endorsing ideas rejected in the Engineers\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 Case<\/em>. Is the Spence <\/em>an indication of a subtle but significant shift in the Court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s approach to adjudicating the boundaries of Commonwealth legislative power?<\/p>\n The Engineers\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 Case and Intergovernmental Immunities: A Century On<\/strong><\/em><\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Stephen Donaghue QC and Christine Ernst<\/p>\n Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd <\/em>(Engineers\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 Case<\/em>) enjoys a seminal status in Australian constitutional law. It famously swept away the doctrines of reserved powers and implied intergovernmental immunities. Following the Engineers\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 Case<\/em>, it was clear that a power to legislate with respect to a given subject enabled the Commonwealth Parliament to make laws which, upon that subject, affected the operations of the States and their agencies. However, in the century since the Engineers\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 Case <\/em>was decided, the High Court has progressively breathed new life into the intergovernmental immunities that were so emphatically rejected in that case. That revival continued in Spence v Queensland<\/em>, where the Court affirmed that the principle derived from Melbourne Corporation v Commonwealth <\/em>operates symmetrically, protecting the Commonwealth as well as the States. This most recent development in the evolution of intergovernmental immunities provides occasion to consider precisely where this leaves the principles articulated a century ago in the Engineers\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 Case<\/em>.<\/p>\n Impairment and Limited State Immunity<\/strong><\/em><\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c David Tan<\/p>\n The modern doctrine of limited State immunity allows the Commonwealth to make laws that affect a State\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s functioning unless those laws impair the States. This article draws attention to a distinction that French CJ made in Clarke v Federal Commissioner of Taxation <\/em>between the practical effects of a law as opposed to non-practical ones. His Honour asserted that non-practical effects must also be taken into account when considering impairment. It is argued that a prohibition against non-practical impairment cannot be derived using the High Court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s methodology for constitutional implications (including principles from Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd <\/em>(Engineers\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 Case<\/em>)). This has an important consequence for constitutional doctrine \u00e2\u20ac\u201c the test of discrimination is not relevant to practical impairment.<\/p>\n Engineers and Constitution-building<\/strong><\/em><\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Cheryl Saunders AO and Michael Crommelin AO<\/p>\n Amalgamated Society of Engineers v Adelaide Steamship Co Ltd <\/em>(The Engineers\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 Case<\/em>) was decided relatively early in the life of the Constitution <\/em>of the Commonwealth of Australia. In contemporary parlance it contributed to \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Constitution-building\u00e2\u20ac\u009d in recently federated Australia. This article examines Engineers <\/em>through the lens of Constitution-building. It explores its continuing relevance for 21st century Australia, after the Constitution <\/em>is well and truly built, the context in which it operates has dramatically changed, and the challenges that Australian federal democracy faces are quite different. It also asks what insights might be drawn from Australian experience with constitutional interpretation in the first few decades of federation for countries elsewhere facing the challenges of implementing new arrangements for multi-level government.<\/p>\n BOOK REVIEW<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Edward Willis <\/em><\/p>\n DEVELOPMENTS<\/a><\/p>\n For the PDF\u00c2\u00a0version of the table of contents, click here: PLR Vol 31 No 1 Contents<\/a><\/p>\n\n
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