*Please note that the links to the content in this Part will direct you to Westlaw AU.<\/p>\n
To purchase an article, please email:\u00c2\u00a0LTA.Service@thomsonreuters.com<\/a>\u00c2\u00a0or\u00c2\u00a0contact us on 1300 304 195\u00c2\u00a0(Australian customers) or +61 2 8587 7980\u00c2\u00a0(international customers) during business hours\u00c2\u00a0(Mon-Fri, 8am-6pm AEST).<\/p>\n The latest issue of the Australian Journal of Competition and Consumer Law<\/em> (Volume 28 Part 4) contains the following material<\/p>\n EDITORIAL<\/a><\/p>\n Batter Up: ACCC Proposes Compulsory \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Final Offer Arbitration\u00e2\u20ac\u009d for Disputes between Media Businesses and Digital Platforms in Australia<\/strong><\/em><\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Sam Luttrell and Dave Poddar<\/em><\/p>\n This article analyses the Mandatory Bargaining Code that the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has proposed to give Australian media businesses the ability to bargain with Google and Facebook to secure fair payment for news content. Under the ACCC\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Code, if an Australian news business fails to reach an agreement with Google or Facebook through negotiation or mediation, the news business will have the right to commence a 45-day compulsory \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Final Offer Arbitration\u00e2\u20ac\u009d process to determine the remuneration that Google or Facebook must pay for the use of its news content. The article focuses on the practical and legal issues that may arise from the use of Final Offer Arbitration to resolve disputes, including whether the arbitration process prescribed by the Code falls within the scope of Australia\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s arbitration legislation and the extent to which determinations made by arbitrators under the Code will be subject to any form of appeal.<\/p>\n Asset Valuation Confusion under Australia\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s National Gas Rules<\/strong><\/em><\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Euan Morton and Matt Rodgers<\/p>\n The introduction of the Information Disclosure and Arbitration Framework provisions under Pt 23 of the Australian National Gas Rules in August 2017 has resulted in an unsuitable asset valuation methodology \u00e2\u20ac\u201c the so-called \u00e2\u20ac\u0153recovered capital method\u00e2\u20ac\u009d (RCM) \u00e2\u20ac\u201c becoming the default valuation methodology to be used in arbitrations involving gas pipelines and their users (shippers), even though it is incompatible with price formation in workably competitive markets (which underpins the objective of Pt 23). The default status of the RCM under Pt 23 arguably says more about the short-term political and regulatory imperative to reduce delivered gas prices in a supply-constrained environment, than good regulatory design that is focused on producing sensible price signals and facilitating robust commercial outcomes in future investment in and use of Australian gas transmission pipelines.<\/p>\n ACCESS TO SERVICES<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: John Hedge<\/em><\/p>\n DEFECTIVE GOODS<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: T H J Cadd<\/em><\/p>\n RESTRICTIVE TRADE PRACTICES<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Julie Clarke<\/em><\/p>\n CASE NOTE<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Christopher Hodgekiss SC<\/em><\/p>\n COUNCIL CONSIDERATIONS<\/a><\/p>\n COMMISSION CAMEOS<\/a><\/p>\n WHAT IF \u00e2\u20ac\u00a6<\/a><\/p>\n COMMENTS FROM COMMERCE<\/a><\/p>\n REPORT FROM CHINA<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Sharon Henrick<\/em><\/p>\n REPORT FROM INDIA<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Pravin Anand<\/em><\/p>\n For the PDF version of the table of contents, click here: AJCCL Vol 28 No 4 Contents<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n
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