{"id":16659,"date":"2024-07-05T04:51:32","date_gmt":"2024-07-05T04:51:32","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/sites.thomsonreuters.com.au\/journals\/?p=16659"},"modified":"2024-07-10T03:54:21","modified_gmt":"2024-07-10T03:54:21","slug":"australian-business-law-review-update-vol-52-pt-2","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sites.thomsonreuters.com.au\/journals\/2024\/07\/05\/australian-business-law-review-update-vol-52-pt-2\/","title":{"rendered":"Australian Business Law Review update: Vol 52 Pt 2"},"content":{"rendered":"

Please note that the links to the content in this Part will direct you to Westlaw AU. If you are using Checkpoint, the links can be found in the Checkpoint PDF <\/strong>at the bottom of this post.<\/p>\n

To purchase an article, please email: LTA.Service@thomsonreuters.com<\/a> or contact us on 1300 304 195 (Australian customers) or +61 2 8587 7980 (international customers) during business hours (Mon-Fri, 8am-6pm AST).<\/p>\n

The latest issue of the Australian Business Law Review <\/em>(Volume 52 Part 2) contains the following material:<\/p>\n

EDITORIAL<\/a> \u2013 General Editor: Michael Terceiro <\/em><\/p>\n

Articles<\/h3>\n

Politically Exposed Persons (PEP) Screening: A Solution to Threats to Research <\/strong>Security?<\/strong><\/em><\/a> \u2013 Brendan Walker-Munro<\/p>\n

Over the last decade, a disturbing trend has emerged. Intelligence agents \u2013 of nations both friendly and adversarial \u2013 have endorsed or participated in acts of espionage, intellectual property theft, and targeted plagiarism against universities in both the East and the West. These actions are undertaken for a variety of motivations: gaining technological supremacy, intellectual sabotage, even diplomatic pressure. In response many Western intelligence agencies have begun working closer with universities, touting the concept of \u201cresearch security\u201d \u2013 the notion of securing the knowledge, invention and innovation developed as part of the everyday functioning of universities. Within that context, this article seeks to achieve three aims. The first is to conduct an analysis of risks facing universities with a view to establishing a hypothesis that \u201cresearch security\u201d centres on the security of individual researchers. The second aim is to then consider an unlikely source of regulatory similarity with research security: the screening of Politically Exposed Persons (PEP) for anti-money laundering and counterterrorism financing. The third aim is to then propose how PEP screening could be adapted to securing the university and higher education sector.<\/p>\n

Towards Legal Recognition of Decentralised Autonomous Organisations<\/em> <\/strong><\/a>\u2013 Aaron M Lane, Darcy WE Allen and Chris Berg<\/p>\n

Decentralised Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) are a typical organisation form in the Web3 economy. DAOs are internet-native organisations that are coordinated and governed by pseudonymous community members through a nexus of blockchain-based digital assets and smart contracts. There is over US$26 billion locked in over 2,300 active DAOs globally. This article examines the legal recognition of DAOs in an Australian context. A recent Australian Senate Inquiry recommended DAOs be recognised as a distinct business structure. This article makes three contributions towards this goal: (1) critically evaluate options for DAO recognition under Australian law; (2) a comparative analysis of United States DAO laws; and (3) an analytical outline of the key design features of an Australian DAO law.<\/p>\n

BOOK REVIEWS<\/a> \u2013 Editor: Nicholas Felstead<\/em><\/p>\n