*Please note that the links to the content in this Part will direct you to Westlaw AU.<\/p>\n
To purchase an article, please email: LTA.Service@thomsonreuters.com or contact us on 1300 304 195 (Australian customers) or +61 2 8587 7980 (international customers) during business hours (Mon-Fri, 8am-6pm AEST).<\/p>\n
The latest issue of the Australian Law Journal (Volume 99 Part 8) contains the following material:<\/p>\n
CURRENT ISSUES<\/a> \u2013 Editor: Justice Fran\u00e7ois Kunc<\/strong><\/p>\n CONVEYANCING \u2013 Editors: Robert Angyal SC and Brendan Edgeworth<\/strong><\/p>\n ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME \u2013 Editor: Dr Damien J Cremean<\/strong><\/p>\n FROM THE LAW SCHOOLS \u2013 Editor: Emeritus Professor David Barker<\/strong><\/p>\n Legislative Purpose, Fact-finding and Preventative Detention Following Lim-NZYQ<\/strong><\/em><\/a>\u00a0\u2013 Ashleigh Barnes<\/p>\n The purpose of the law of preventative detention is two-fold: it aims to strike a balance between the protection of the community and individual liberty. To achieve this, a doctrinal framework that allows for the appropriate balancing of these dual objects is needed. In Australia, this balancing exercise is struck by Parliament and supervised by the judiciary. The judiciary requires a workable framework and set of standards against which to measure the constitutional validity of a preventative detention regime. This framework must be capable of being applied in a coherent and consistent manner. This essay argues that one problem with the Lim-NZYQ framework, as applied to the law of preventative detention in Australia, is that it rests on a fiction around constitutional facts. It should be clarified and reformed by reference to the cardinal principles of coherence and transparency in judicial reasoning.<\/p>\n The Federal Court’s Defamation Jurisdiction: Revisiting Crosby v Kelly<\/strong><\/em><\/a> \u2013 Myles Pulsford<\/p>\n The interpretation in Crosby v Kelly <\/em>of s 9(3) of the Jurisdiction of Courts (Crossvesting) Act 1987 (Cth) as a law of the Commonwealth for the purposes of s 76(ii) of the Constitution has had significant consequences for the Australian Judicature, including, most notably, the establishment of the Federal Court\u2019s defamation jurisdiction. This article considers and tests the conceptual underpinnings of Crosby v Kelly\u2019s reasoning. While the Commonwealth Parliament undoubtedly has legislative power to confer jurisdiction on the Federal Court with respect to defamatory publications in the territories, this article argues that there is considerable doubt that, as a matter of statutory construction, that power was exercised in the enactment of s 9(3). If the Federal Court\u2019s jurisdiction cannot be sustained under s 9(3), this article argues that there would not appear to be a clear and established basis for the Federal Court to hear and determine defamation proceedings.<\/p>\n Civil Penalties: A New Doctrine of Deterrence?<\/strong><\/em><\/a> \u2013\u00a0 John Sheahan KC and Tim Rogan<\/p>\n The High Court\u2019s decision in Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Pattinson <\/em>established that deterrence is the sole purpose of civil penalties. While this was treated as confirmation of an orthodoxy dating back to the decision of French J in Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd<\/em>, Pattison marked a departure from the pattern of established cases in civil penalties. The deterrence-alone paradigm in civil penalties presents new challenges for courts and litigants, the dimensions of which are not widely appreciated. This article seeks to outline the mode of addressing penalties that is called for by a deterrence paradigm, and to suggest some tools for addressing the challenges to which it gives rise.<\/p>\n For the PDF version of the table of contents, click here: New Westlaw Australia – ALJ Vol 99 No 8 Contents<\/a><\/p>\n Click here to access this Part on New Westlaw AU<\/a><\/p>\n\n
\n
\n
\n
Articles<\/h3>\n