*Please note that the links to the content in this Part will direct you to Westlaw AU.<\/p>\n
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The latest issue of the Australian Law Journal (Volume 100 Part 5) contains the following material:<\/p>\n
CURRENT ISSUES<\/a> \u2013 Editor: Justice Fran\u00e7ois Kunc <\/strong><\/p>\n CONVEYANCING AND PROPERTY \u2013 Editors: Robert Angyal SC and Brendan Edgeworth <\/strong><\/p>\n EQUITY AND TRUSTS \u2013 Editor: Aryan Mohseni <\/strong><\/p>\n RECENT CASES \u2013 Editor: Ruth Higgins <\/strong><\/p>\n An Australian Law of Expert Opinion Evidence?<\/strong><\/a> \u2013 <\/strong><\/em>Gary Edmond<\/p>\n In Lang v The Queen <\/em>the common law and uniform evidence law (UEL) on expert opinion evidence appear to have been harmonised. This article provides an overview of the rules regulating the admission of most expert opinion. It outlines the basic requirements, provides a little commentary, and supplements the admissibility rules with clarification around the status of some historical restrictions \u2013 such as the basis, ultimate issue and common knowledge rules \u2013 which have been modified or abolished. It also reviews procedural shortcuts, the responsibility of the tribunal of fact for the resolution of expert disagreement and uncertainty, as well as expectations around witness impartiality and the contents of expert reports (from practice directions). The discussion applies to expert opinion in all legal proceedings, but the primary focus is on the admission and evaluation of scientific, technical and biomedical evidence in criminal prosecutions and appeals. Returning to the appeal in Lang<\/em>, and the contested opinion of a forensic pathologist, the article explains why the High Court\u2019s admissibility jurisprudence remains incomplete.<\/p>\n The Challenge of Regulating \u201cMisinformation\u201d and <\/em><\/strong><\/a>\u201cDisinformation\u201d \u2013\u00a0<\/em><\/strong>Mark Humphery-Jenner<\/p>\n It is often argued that misinformation and disinformation should be suppressed as they perpetuate false or misleading narratives, and can contribute to, or cause, significant harm. However, such anti-misinformation rules face significant challenges and can undermine free speech. Australia\u2019s foray into anti-misinformation rules provides a cautionary example. The problems start with broad and uncertain definitions of misinformation. Further, due to self-interest, lobbying, or misplaced assumptions of accuracy, powerful interests are often exempted from anti-misinformation rules. Enforcement mechanisms also risk suppressing innocuous content in service of reducing the chance of misinformation falling through the cracks. Anti-misinformation rules thus face significant problems that must be solved if they are to be implemented.<\/p>\n\n
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