{"id":3223,"date":"2012-02-03T12:34:39","date_gmt":"2012-02-03T01:34:39","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/sites.thomsonreuters.com.au\/journals\/?p=3223"},"modified":"2012-02-03T12:34:39","modified_gmt":"2012-02-03T01:34:39","slug":"australian-business-law-review-update-february-2012","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/sites.thomsonreuters.com.au\/journals\/2012\/02\/03\/australian-business-law-review-update-february-2012\/","title":{"rendered":"Australian Business Law Review update: February 2012"},"content":{"rendered":"

The latest issue of the Australian Business Law Review <\/em>(Volume 40 Part 1) contains the following material:<\/p>\n

EDITORIAL<\/a><\/p>\n

Articles<\/h3>\n

Theoretical justifications for restraining \u00e2\u20ac\u0153unconscionable\u00e2\u20ac\u009d demands under on-demand guarantees<\/em><\/strong><\/a> <\/strong>\u00e2\u20ac\u201c <\/em>Thanuja Rodrigo<\/p>\n

Whilst English courts have adopted \u00e2\u20ac\u0153fraud\u00e2\u20ac\u009d on the part of the beneficiary calling under the guarantee as the sole ground upon which the enforcement of on-demand guarantees can be restrained, the Australian courts have adopted \u00e2\u20ac\u0153unconscionability\u00e2\u20ac\u009d as a separate ground from that of \u00e2\u20ac\u0153fraud\u00e2\u20ac\u009d for restraining the enforcement of such guarantees. Drawing upon the doctrine of \u00e2\u20ac\u0153freedom of contract\u00e2\u20ac\u009d and principles of \u00e2\u20ac\u0153cost-benefit\u00e2\u20ac\u009d in economics this article provides theoretical justifications for the Australian court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s divergence from the English law principles in matters restraining demands under on-demand guarantees.<\/p>\n

To purchase this article, complete the Individual Article Sale<\/a> order form and email it to tlranz.journal.orders@thomsonreuters.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n

The Dodd-Frank Act whistleblower reforms put bounty on corporate non-compliance: Ramifications and lessons for Australia<\/em><\/strong><\/a> <\/strong>\u00e2\u20ac\u201c <\/em>Nicholas Mavrakis and Michael Legg<\/p>\n

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act <\/em>introduced into United States law new whistleblower reforms to encourage the reporting of breaches of the United States securities laws. The reforms controversially included monetary incentives or bounties to report illegal conduct to the Securities Exchange Commission. The article explains the Dodd-Frank Act <\/em>whistleblower reforms and examines the concerns raised by public companies and directors that internal compliance mechanisms may be undermined by the bounty provisions. The article also explains how the whistleblower reforms may have extra-territorial operation and allow for the reporting of conduct in Australia so that American subsidiaries or Australian entities dealing with American public companies also need to consider how they should respond to the new laws. The first annual report on the whistleblower reforms which only covered seven weeks discloses that three tips (9.4% of overseas tips) have already come from Australia. Lastly, the article compares the Dodd-Frank Act <\/em>whistleblower reforms with the Australian equivalent in Pt 9.4AAA of the Corporations Act 2001 <\/em>(Cth) to examine if there are any lessons for Australian corporate regulation.<\/p>\n

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Sections<\/h3>\n

BANKING AND FINANCE<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Paul Ali<\/em><\/p>\n