*Please note that the links to the content in this Part will direct you to Westlaw AU.<\/p>\n
The latest issue of the\u00c2\u00a0Australian Law Journal<\/em> (Volume 90 Part 2) contains the following material:<\/p>\n CURRENT ISSUES<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Ruth C A Higgins <\/strong><\/p>\n CONVEYANCING AND PROPERTY<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Peter Butt <\/strong><\/p>\n PERSONALIA<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Clare Langford <\/strong><\/p>\n Commonwealth <\/strong><\/p>\n Victoria <\/strong><\/p>\n Western Australia <\/strong><\/p>\n EQUITY AND TRUSTS<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Justice Mark Leeming <\/strong><\/p>\n ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Dr Damien J Cremean <\/strong><\/p>\n COMPETITION AND CONSUMER LAW<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Robert Baxt AO <\/strong><\/p>\n RECENT CASES<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Ruth C A Higgins <\/strong><\/p>\n Lord Denning: His Judicial Philosophy<\/a><\/strong><\/em>\u00c2\u00a0\u00e2\u20ac\u201c<\/strong>\u00c2\u00a0Justice James Douglas<\/p>\n Lord Denning (1899-1999) was the most famous English judge of the 20th century, largely because of his willingness to reconsider and reform legal principle. He was also unique in identifying and expressing his judicial philosophy, namely: (i) Let justice be done; (ii) Freedom under the law; and (iii) Put your trust in God. The author briefly details Lord Denning\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s upbringing and early career and examines how his judicial philosophy played out in certain fields of law, with an emphasis on associated developments in Australia. The author concludes with some observations about his Achilles\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 heel as a judge: too great a readiness to confuse personal prejudice with his notions of justice.<\/p>\n To purchase this article, complete the\u00c2\u00a0Individual Article Sale<\/a>\u00c2\u00a0order form and email it to\u00c2\u00a0tlranz.journal.orders@thomsonreuters.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n Australia\u00c2\u00a0is Different: Restitution\u00c2\u00a0and the\u00c2\u00a0Australian Constitution<\/a><\/em><\/strong>\u00c2\u00a0\u00e2\u20ac\u201c<\/strong>\u00c2\u00a0Brian Mason<\/p>\n Restitution in Australia is different. This is usually explained by the limited, conceptual role unjust enrichment performs in Australian law. This article explores a further explanation: the judiciary\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s functions and responsibilities in Australia\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s constitutional framework. Using the High Court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s decision in New South Wales v Kable<\/em> (2013) 252 CLR 118 as the prism for its analysis, this article examines how this framework can influence the development and application of two restitutionary principles in Australian law. The first is the principle allowing ultimately successful litigants to recover amounts they have paid under earlier judgments which are subsequently set aside, together with interest. This principle must be tailored to suit the constitutional explanation that a superior court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s orders remain enforceable until overturned on appeal. The second is the principle permitting taxpayers to recover any overpaid tax, together with interest, which is unnecessary given the Australian superior courts\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 constitutionally enshrined judicial review jurisdiction.<\/p>\n To purchase this article, complete the\u00c2\u00a0Individual Article Sale<\/a>\u00c2\u00a0order form and email it to\u00c2\u00a0tlranz.journal.orders@thomsonreuters.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n For the PDF version of the table of contents, click here: ALJ Vol 90 No 2 Contents<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n
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