*Please note that the links to the content in this Part will direct you to Westlaw AU.<\/p>\n
The latest issue of the Australian Journal of Administrative Law<\/em> (Volume 23 Part 3) contains the following material:<\/p>\n IMMIGRATION AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Stephen Tully<\/em><\/p>\n WORK AND EMPLOYMENT <\/a>\u00e2\u20ac\u201c Beth Gaze <\/em>and Joanna Howe<\/em><\/p>\n CASENOTES<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Nathalie Ng<\/em><\/p>\n The evolution of the duty of decision-makers to give reasons<\/a> <\/strong>\u00e2\u20ac\u201c <\/em>Ronald Sackville<\/p>\n In Public Service Board (NSW) v Osmond<\/em> (1986) 159 CLR 656, the High Court established that statutory decision-makers, other than courts, are not required to give reasons for decisions, unless the governing legislation provides otherwise. Thirty years later little remains of this common law principle. As a consequence of legislative reforms and judicial innovations, there is now relatively little difference between the duty of courts to give reasons and the duties imposed directly or indirectly, on statutory decision-makers. The obligation to give cogent reasons is well on the way to becoming universal. Increasingly, therefore, the focus is not on whether a decision-maker must give reasons, but on the adequacy of those reasons. This article examines the developments that have\u00c2\u00a0produced this outcome.<\/p>\n To purchase this article, complete the\u00c2\u00a0Individual Article Sale<\/a>\u00c2\u00a0order form and email it to\u00c2\u00a0tlranz.journal.orders@thomsonreuters.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n \u00e2\u20ac\u0153JUDGES AND THE ACADEMY\u00e2\u20ac\u009d SEMINAR ARTICLES<\/strong><\/p>\n Introduction: Is there a difference between \u00e2\u20ac\u0153natural justice\u00e2\u20ac\u009d and \u00e2\u20ac\u0153procedural fairness\u00e2\u20ac\u009d?<\/a><\/strong><\/p>\n Earlier versions of the following three articles were presented at a seminar held at Melbourne Law School in September 2015, in which a number of judges and academics took part. The seminar was part of the \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Judges and the Academy\u00e2\u20ac\u009d series, jointly convened by Justice Chris Maxwell, President of the Victorian Court of Appeal, Professor Adrienne Stone of Melbourne Law School and Professor Jeff Goldsworthy of Monash Law School.<\/p>\n Why do we have rules of procedural fairness?<\/a> <\/strong>\u00e2\u20ac\u201c<\/em> James Edelman<\/p>\n This article considers the theory underlying rules of procedural fairness. Although there is no magic in words, this area could best be understood by a clear nomenclature. A convenient language to adopt would be to separate the meanings of two expressions often used interchangeably: procedural fairness and natural justice. Natural justice is one theory for the foundational principle for the rules of procedural fairness, deriving principle from practice and morality. There are difficulties for the theory, and it cannot explain important areas of doctrine which can only be explained by its competitor which is a utilitarian theory of rules of procedural fairness. Nevertheless, confronting the foundation for procedural fairness the rules can be developed and understood in a transparent and consistent manner.<\/p>\n To purchase this article, complete the\u00c2\u00a0Individual Article Sale<\/a>\u00c2\u00a0order form and email it to\u00c2\u00a0tlranz.journal.orders@thomsonreuters.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n Natural justice or procedural fairness<\/a> <\/strong>\u00e2\u20ac\u201c <\/em>Justice Alan Robertson<\/p>\n This article traces the history of the terminology \u00e2\u20ac\u0153natural justice\u00e2\u20ac\u009d and \u00e2\u20ac\u0153procedural fairness\u00e2\u20ac\u009d and suggests it is preferable to use the term \u00e2\u20ac\u0153procedural fairness\u00e2\u20ac\u009d. Resort to \u00e2\u20ac\u0153natural justice\u00e2\u20ac\u009d does not assist in making the judgment of what is, or is not, procedurally fair in the circumstances of a particular case. \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Procedural fairness\u00e2\u20ac\u009d is a technical legal expression and, as such, is less likely to be confused with the \u00e2\u20ac\u0153correctness\u00e2\u20ac\u009d of the decision itself, whereas the term \u00e2\u20ac\u0153natural justice\u00e2\u20ac\u009d may readily translate into no more than disagreement with the result.<\/p>\n To purchase this article, complete the\u00c2\u00a0Individual Article Sale<\/a>\u00c2\u00a0order form and email it to\u00c2\u00a0tlranz.journal.orders@thomsonreuters.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n The stakes of procedural fairness: Reflections on Australian position<\/a> <\/strong>\u00e2\u20ac\u201c <\/em>Kristen Rundle<\/p>\n The justification for the rules of procedural fairness is often explained in \u00e2\u20ac\u0153dignitarian\u00e2\u20ac\u009d terms that prioritise the dignity of the person or \u00e2\u20ac\u0153utilitarian\u00e2\u20ac\u009d terms that focus on the contribution of the rules to better decision-making outcomes. This article explores what might be at stake in these different justifications for the exercise of administrative authority specifically.<\/p>\n To purchase this article, complete the\u00c2\u00a0Individual Article Sale<\/a>\u00c2\u00a0order form and email it to\u00c2\u00a0tlranz.journal.orders@thomsonreuters.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n BOOK REVIEWS<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Greg Weeks<\/em><\/p>\n For the PDF\u00c2\u00a0version of the table of contents, click here: AJ Admin L Vol 23 No 3 Contents<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n
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