*Please note that the links to the content in this Part will direct you to Westlaw AU.<\/p>\n
The latest issue of the\u00c2\u00a0Australian Law Journal<\/em> (Volume 90 Part 11) contains the following material:<\/p>\n CURRENT ISSUES<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Justice Fran\u00c3\u00a7ois Kunc <\/strong><\/p>\n CONVEYANCING AND PROPERTY<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Peter Butt <\/strong><\/p>\n FROM THE LAW SCHOOLS<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Professor Michael Coper <\/strong><\/p>\n HUMAN RIGHTS<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Simon Rice <\/strong><\/p>\n EQUITY AND TRUSTS<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Justice Mark Leeming <\/strong><\/p>\n ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Dr Damien J Cremean <\/strong><\/p>\n RECENT CASES<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Ruth C A Higgins <\/strong><\/p>\n Procedural Fairness: The Age of Legitimate Expectation is Over<\/strong><\/em><\/a>\u00c2\u00a0\u00e2\u20ac\u201c\u00c2\u00a0<\/strong><\/em>Naomi Sharp<\/p>\n This article reviews some of the key principles underpinning the law of procedural fairness in Australia and also charts some significant new developments. Taking the High Court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s landmark decision in Kioa v West<\/em> (1985) 159 CLR 550 as a starting point, this article traces the key developments in the law of procedural fairness as to the source of the obligation to afford procedural fairness; the criteria that attract the obligation and the scope of the obligation. A particular focus of this article is on charting the rise and fall of legitimate expectation as an analytical construct in determining whether an obligation of procedural fairness arises in the first place, and if it does, what the content of that obligation is in the circumstances. In short, given the breadth of the interest now accepted as attracting the obligation to afford procedural fairness, the key questions are now whether a legislative intent can be discerned to exclude that obligation, and if not, what the content of that obligation is in the particular circumstances of the case.<\/p>\n To purchase this article, complete the\u00c2\u00a0Individual Article Sale<\/a>\u00c2\u00a0order form and email it to\u00c2\u00a0tlranz.journal.orders@thomsonreuters.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n His or Her Duty to Keep Secret<\/strong><\/em><\/a>\u00c2\u00a0\u00e2\u20ac\u201c\u00c2\u00a0<\/strong><\/em>Julie Kinross and Peter Davis QC<\/p>\n Public officers may be disciplined, and\/or face criminal sanction for unauthorised disclosure of information. Specific offence provisions detail the type of information legislatures consider criminal to disclose. General secrecy offences require a \u00e2\u20ac\u0153duty to keep secret\u00e2\u20ac\u009d element to be proved. Prosecutors have started to use codes of conduct to establish the duty element. This approach clouds the long held distinction between conduct attracting disciplinary sanction and serious conduct warranting criminal sanction. Tasmania v Johnston<\/em> (2009) 18 Tas R 195 provides judicial authority against this approach. A contextual analysis is applied to the original 1899 \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Disclosure of other official secrets\u00e2\u20ac\u009d offence to support that finding. Johnston and the analysis have national implications for the success of future prosecutions of the general secrecy offence.<\/p>\n To purchase this article, complete the\u00c2\u00a0Individual Article Sale<\/a>\u00c2\u00a0order form and email it to\u00c2\u00a0tlranz.journal.orders@thomsonreuters.com<\/a>.<\/p>\n BOOKS RECEIVED<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Angelina A Gomez <\/strong><\/p>\n BOOK REVIEWS<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Editor: Angelina A Gomez <\/strong><\/p>\n OBITUARY <\/strong><\/a><\/p>\n For the PDF\u00c2\u00a0version of the table of contents, click here: ALJ Vol 90 No 11 Contents<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n
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