*Please note that the links to the content in this Part will direct you to Westlaw AU.<\/p>\n
To purchase an article, please email:\u00c2\u00a0LTA.Service@thomsonreuters.com<\/a>\u00c2\u00a0or\u00c2\u00a0contact us on 1300 304 195\u00c2\u00a0(Australian customers) or +61 2 8587 7980\u00c2\u00a0(international customers) during business hours\u00c2\u00a0(Mon-Fri, 8am-6pm AEST).<\/p>\n The latest issue of the Australian Journal of Competition and Consumer Law<\/em> (Volume 25 Part 1) contains the following material:<\/p>\n EDITORIAL<\/a><\/p>\n Triple A Rated? Regulating Online Information Disclosures <\/strong><\/a>\u00e2\u20ac\u201c <\/em>Robert Walker and Rosannah Healy<\/p>\n Efficient markets require consumers to be able to compare offers and make informed choices. Empowered consumers force firms to compete on price, service delivery and innovation. The \u00e2\u20ac\u0153digital revolution\u00e2\u20ac\u009d has played an important role in reducing transaction costs and correcting information asymmetries between firms and consumers. The internet provides consumers with access to more information than ever before, presenting new issues and challenges for regulators and policy-makers. Competition and consumer laws play a key role in ensuring that consumers reap the full benefits of the shift online. This article uses the \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Access, Assess, Act\u00e2\u20ac\u009d behavioural economics framework developed by the UK\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Office of Fair Trading (now the Competition and Markets Authority) to analyse current and future trends in the regulation of online disclosures of information under competition and consumer laws both in Australia and overseas.<\/p>\n Is There a Gap in the Unfair Contract Term Provisions Between a \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Consumer Contract\u00e2\u20ac\u009d and a \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Small Business Contract\u00e2\u20ac\u009d? <\/strong><\/a>\u00e2\u20ac\u201c <\/em>Peter Sise<\/p>\n Since 12 November 2016, the unfair contract term provisions in Pt 2-3 of the Australian Consumer Law <\/em>have applied to \u00e2\u20ac\u0153small business contracts\u00e2\u20ac\u009d. Previously, they only applied to \u00e2\u20ac\u0153consumer contracts\u00e2\u20ac\u009d. It is possible that a contract entered into by a vulnerable individual may qualify as neither a \u00e2\u20ac\u0153consumer contract\u00e2\u20ac\u009d nor a \u00e2\u20ac\u0153small business contract\u00e2\u20ac\u009d, in which case the individual will fall into a gap in the protection provided by the unfair contract term provisions. Such a gap does not exist for other provisions in the Australian Consumer Law <\/em>which are intended to protect the vulnerable, such as the prohibition on unconscionable conduct. This article considers whether such a gap exists and if it does, whether this represents a policy failure.<\/p>\n The Cartelist\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Dilemma: Leniency Policies and Game Theory <\/strong><\/a>\u00e2\u20ac\u201c <\/em>Nick Kotzman<\/p>\n Leniency policies have become a staple of the cartel enforcer\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s toolkit. Policies differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but generally involve granting the first eligible cartel participant full exemption from civil and criminal proceedings for cartel conduct. This article examines the theoretical underpinnings of leniency policies by applying the Prisoner\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Dilemma to cartelists. Over three iterations, the article develops a model called the \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Cartelist\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Dilemma\u00e2\u20ac\u009d to analyse the reactions of cartelists to the offer of leniency. With each iteration, another layer of complexity is added so that the final iteration reflects the Immunity Policy administered by the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC). Using this model, four reforms are proposed to improve the effectiveness of the ACCC\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Immunity Policy: removing the coercer exception; codifying \u00e2\u20ac\u0153partial leniency\u00e2\u20ac\u009d; limiting private actions with \u00e2\u20ac\u0153bar orders\u00e2\u20ac\u009d; and increasing penalties for cartel conduct.<\/p>\n AUTHORISATIONS AND NOTIFICATIONS<\/a><\/p>\n CONSUMER PROTECTION<\/a><\/p>\n ENFORCEMENT AND REMEDIES<\/a><\/p>\n TELECOMMUNICATIONS<\/a><\/p>\n CASE NOTES<\/a><\/p>\n ENERGY ETCHINGS<\/a><\/p>\n SNAPSHOTS<\/a>\u00c2\u00a0\u00e2\u20ac\u201c Douglas Shirrefs<\/em><\/p>\n REPORT FROM AFRICA<\/a><\/p>\n For the PDF version of the table of contents, click here: AJCCL Vol 25 No 1 Contents<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n
Articles<\/h3>\n
\n
\n
\n
\n
\n
\n
\n
\n