*Please note that the links to the content in this Part will direct you to Westlaw AU.<\/p>\n
To purchase an article, please email:\u00c2\u00a0LTA.Service@thomsonreuters.com<\/a>\u00c2\u00a0or\u00c2\u00a0contact us on 1300 304 195\u00c2\u00a0(Australian customers) or +61 2 8587 7980\u00c2\u00a0(international customers) during business hours\u00c2\u00a0(Mon-Fri, 8am-6pm AEST).<\/p>\n The latest issue of the Public Law Review<\/em> (Volume 28 Part 1) contains the following material:<\/p>\n COMMENTS<\/a><\/p>\n SPEECH<\/strong><\/p>\n The Increasing Internationalisation of Australian Law <\/strong><\/a>\u00e2\u20ac\u201c <\/em>Justin Gleeson SC<\/p>\n Amongst the United States Supreme Court justices, Justice Stephen Breyer is the most outward-looking in his insistence that the law of that country must be open to international influences. This article, which is an edited version of the Patron\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Lecture given to the Australian Academy of Law in October 2016, seeks to adapt Breyer\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s thesis to the Australian context. It identifies eight drivers which open Australian law to international influences: the terms of the Constitution<\/em> adopted in 1900, treaty-making since then, the increase in international commerce, the attitude of judges and counsel, increasing exposure of the Commonwealth to international dispute resolution, the Commonwealth exposing the States and Territories to international law claims, international law claims repackaged domestically, and finally, renvoi from international or foreign law to domestic law. It concludes with suggestions for changes in legal training and practices to accommodate these international influences.<\/p>\n Deliberation at the Founding: Deliberative Democracy as an Original Constitutional Value <\/strong><\/a>\u00e2\u20ac\u201c <\/em>Ron Levy, Neomal Silva and Benjamin B Saunders<\/p>\n This article examines whether Australia\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s constitutional founders intended that a deliberative form of democratic government should govern federally in Australia. Deliberative democratic ideals have long occupied a prominent place in democratic theory. However, they have seldom been brought to bear in a sustained way on historical questions about Australia\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s constitutional design. For constitutional scholars, democratic deliberation is now generally a forgotten element of the Australian constitutional system. We show here how the framers concerned themselves with democratic deliberation, including how precisely they envisaged deliberative democratic practices during the federation Conventions and within the new federation. Our focus is on the framers\u00e2\u20ac\u2122 understandings of deliberation within the institution of Parliament, and the subsidiary issues bearing on that question such as the relationship between Parliament and the executive and the role of political parties. Our research suggests that deliberative democracy should assume a prominent place alongside more widely acknowledged original constitutional values.<\/p>\n Is the Crown Expected to be a Model Litigant in New Zealand? <\/strong><\/a>\u00e2\u20ac\u201c <\/em>Anthea Williams<\/p>\n This article examines the use of the term \u00e2\u20ac\u0153model litigant\u00e2\u20ac\u009d in New Zealand jurisprudence, noting the inconsistency in how it has been applied against the Crown, and the lack of a broadly accepted understanding of what it requires. In 2013, the New Zealand Government issued the \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Attorney-General\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s Values\u00e2\u20ac\u009d, but these are not yet widely known or applied. New Zealand should adopt an indigenous understanding of any such obligation rather than adopting existing Australian guidelines. There are various bases for holding the Crown to a higher standard of behaviour in civil litigation, some of which differ from possible Australian sources. The Crown\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s constitutional role as the \u00e2\u20ac\u0153fountain of justice\u00e2\u20ac\u009d is the most appropriate basis for founding such an expectation in New Zealand. The extent to which the obligation is enforceable should be determined by the Crown. The Crown is best placed to understand the political and cultural obligations at the heart of any issue of model litigant behaviour.<\/p>\n DEVELOPMENTS<\/a><\/p>\n For the PDF\u00c2\u00a0version of the table of contents, click here: PLR Vol 28 No 1 Contents<\/a><\/p>\n\n
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