*Please note that the links to the content in this Part will direct you to Westlaw AU.<\/p>\n
To purchase an article, please email: LTA.Service@thomsonreuters.com<\/a> or contact us on 1300 304 195 (Australian customers) or +61 2 8587 7980 (international customers) during business hours (Mon-Fri, 8am-6pm AST).<\/p>\n The latest issue of the Australian Journal of Administrative Law<\/em> (Volume 24 Part 1) contains the following material:<\/p>\n EDITORIAL<\/a><\/p>\n CURRENT ISSUES<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Justin Davidson<\/em>, Katie Miller <\/em>and Stephen Tully<\/em><\/p>\n Balancing the Discretionary Seesaw: Are Community Values an Appropriate Guide for the AAT\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s \u00e2\u20ac\u0153Preferable\u00e2\u20ac\u009d Decisions? <\/strong><\/a>\u00e2\u20ac\u201c <\/em>Madeleine Harkin<\/p>\n This article examines the discretionary decision-making power of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, focusing on Downes J\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s proposal that community values should guide these decisions. It is contended that community values are an inappropriate guide as their existence is questionable and their use is fraught with problems.<\/p>\n The Function of s 75(v) of the Constitution <\/strong><\/a>\u00e2\u20ac\u201c <\/em>Lindsay Muir<\/p>\n It is settled that Parliament cannot formally deny the High Court its jurisdiction to review for jurisdictional error under s 75(v) of the Constitution. However, it remains unclear the extent to which Parliament can functionally reduce the scope of this jurisdiction through no-invalidity clauses or other drafting mechanisms. This article argues that a \u00e2\u20ac\u0153thin\u00e2\u20ac\u009d version of the rule of law, namely non-arbitrary government, would provide the least controversial, and therefore the most robust, foundation to define the boundaries of the High Court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s jurisdiction under s 75(v). This is because the proposition that s 75(v) entrenches the value of non-arbitrary government is consistent with most approaches to constitutional interpretation. This article also recognises how a number of entrenched common law concepts will limit the scope of the High Court\u00e2\u20ac\u2122s jurisdiction under s 75(v) but demonstrates how the value of non-arbitrary government can be reconciled with these limits via a rule versus standard analysis.<\/p>\n Australian Ombudsmen: Drafting a Blueprint for Reform<\/strong><\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c <\/em>Anita Stuhmcke<\/p>\n The ombudsman institution was introduced across all Australian jurisdictions from the 1970s as a central piece of administrative law reform. The original role of the office was to scrutinise administrative decision making and to promote government accountability through the resolution of citizen complaints. However, since the 1970s all Australian governments have undergone significant change. Government has expanded involvement into areas such as whistle blower and disability protection and human rights. Government also increasingly outsources decision-making to private companies, leading to the introduction of private industry ombudsmen and the removal of control from the purview of administrative law transparency mechanisms. This article argues that this transformation necessitates discussion as to reform of the ombudsman institution and suggests a new blueprint for such reform.<\/p>\n BOOK REVIEWS<\/a> \u00e2\u20ac\u201c Janina Boughey<\/em><\/p>\n For the PDF\u00c2\u00a0version of the table of contents, click here: AJ Admin L Vol 24 No 1 Contents<\/a>.<\/p>\n\n
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